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JOHN S. PYKE, JR.*
Architectural controls, or as they are more accurately termed, design and de-
molition controls, are now widely accepted as an effective means to protect and
preserve structures which have a special value to the community because of historical,
aesthetic, or cultural significance. Municipalities ranging in size from New York City
and Chicago to Binghamton, New York, and Lake Forest, Illinois, have adopted
ordinances regulating the demolition of landmark structures and the changes that
may be made in the exterior appearance and design of such structures.
This article will examine the application of design and demolition controls to the
individual landmark property. There will be an attempt to identify the legal
justification for imposing such controls on a single landmark structure in an other-
wise historically insignificant neighborhood, while leaving unaffected the buildings
surrounding the regulated structure. The question is of importance because such
controls infringe on the landmark owner's right to use his property as he desires and
require him to bear, perhaps involuntarily, the cost of preserving a structure
which others have deemed worthy of preservation. Also considered are the par-
ticular devices employed in preservation ordinances to balance the public's interest
in historic preservation with the economic interests of the private owner.
I
REGULATING Tn IsOLATEI) LANDMARK
The use of the police power to preserve landmarks initially took the form of an
ordinance to protect the special character of an historic district1 The term historic
district is used herein as it is typically used in the ordinances, namely, to refer to an
area which has a special historic or aesthetic value. In the earliest cases which
established the validity of design and demolition controls, state appellate courts
construed and upheld regulations applicable to defined districts.2 Controls over
districts were extended to individual landmark structures, beginning in the mid-
i95o's. Today the value of regulating structures both as a class within an historic
*Attorney, The Hanna Mining Company and author of LANDM AR1 PRESERVrION (1969).
'New Orleans (2925) and Charleston, South Carolina (1931), were among the first cities to adopt
preservation ordinances; the ordinances created and regulated a single historic district in each city.
J. Moiusos, Hisroac PREsERvATioN Law 129-86 (1965).
' City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941); Opinion of the Justices to
the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 783,
128 N.E.2d 563 (1955).
a Philadelphia, Pa. was the first city to regulate individual landmarks whatever their location. Tinkcom,
The Philadelphia Historical Commission: Organization and Procedures, 36 LAw & CNTEMP. PRo,. 386
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district and as individual structures wherever they may be situated is widely acknowl-
edged; recent ordinances commonly include both types of structures under the
regulatory umbrella The question then becomes, does the legal justification for
historic district regulation also support regulation of individual landmarks scattered
throughout a city?
While the law of zoning serves as the principal precedent for historic district
regulation and is a well-recognized exercise of the police power, it offers only partial
support for regulation of isolated landmarks. If zoning is defined as the territorial
division of a city according to uniformities of use within each division,5 then the law
of zoning will be of little service as precedent when a municipality regulates by
ignoring districts and imposing controls on scattered structures. The Louisiana
Supreme Court upheld the Vieux Carre regulations in City of New Orleans v.
Pergament, precisely because they applied to a district: "The purpose of the ordinance
is not only to preserve the old buildings themselves, but to preserve the antiquity
of the whole French and Spanish quarter, the tout ensemble... ."' To this Court
at least, the whole was greater than its parts.
Moreover, any attempt to justify regulation of isolated landmarks as part of a
zoning scheme runs the risk of exposing the regulations to attack as spot zoning.
The very antithesis of planned zoning, spot zoning is the arbitrary singling out of
one parcel for treatment different than that accorded to surrounding parcels and it
it universally condemned by all state courts as an improper exercise of the police
power.
Court decisions in zoning cases do yield some arguments justifying the imposition
of controls over isolated landmarks. Both the Louisiana Supreme Court in upholding
the Vieux Carre ordinance and the Massachusetts Supreme Court in upholding the
Nantucket Historic District Act referred to the value of the districts as tourist
attractions.1 The same reasoning will justify regulation of the individual landmark
which itself is a tourist attraction, such as New York City's J. P. Morgan and Com-
pany Building at Broad and Wall Streets, or St. Patrick's Cathedral.
The view that zoning ordinances based predominantly or purely on aesthetic
considerations are proper exercises of the police power has been firmly established by
the New York courts, and a number of other state courts have accepted this point
of view.8 Therefore, even if the isolated landmark is not itself a tourist attraction
but is solely a beautiful building, regulation of its alteration or demolition might
'See, e.g., CmecAGo, ILL., REv. MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 21-64 (x968).
'See Iox C.j.S. Zoning § r (1958).
City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941).
'City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d (I941); Opinion of the Justices to
the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass.
783, 128 N.E.2d 563 (x955).
'Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 29 A.D.2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1968); Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19
N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749 (1967). See Henley, Beautiful as Well as Sanitary-Architectural Controls
by Municipalities in Illinois, 59 ILi.. B.J. 36 (1970).
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be justified in those states holding the more liberal view on the grounds that it
promotes aesthetic objectives.
There are several possible approaches to regulating the isolated landmark in
the context of a local zoning ordinance, and among these are the so-called "floating
zone" and the "mini-district." These have much in common: they both are in-
corporated into the local zoning ordinance, both achieve substantially the same
result, and both have misleading nomenclature.
These techniques are of fairly recent origin and were created in an attempt
to give municipal authorities more flexibility in regulating individual uses of prop-
erty with respect to location, site planning, and design. They are in part an attempt
to maintain the strong federal and state constitutional mandates to secure uniformity
in the application of regulations and to avoid the granting of special privileges and
emoluments, while at the same time enabling a city to deal more flexibly and pre-
cisely with individual owners of property. Generally they are framed to meet the
requirement in virtually all state zoning enabling acts that regulations affecting the
use of property be uniform throughout each district.
The "floating zone," in reality, does not float. Essentially it is a zoning category,
defined in the text of an ordinance, which has specified criteria for eligibility rather
than a fixed geographical location. By adopting criteria for qualification, the govern-
ing body makes an advance statement of the terms and conditions under which it
will rezone individual properties to the floating zone category at the request of any
owner who can demonstrate at any time that his property meets the specified
criteria. In the case of the floating landmark zone, the ordinance would also impose
design and demolition controls, and possibly other requirements, on properties
rezoned to the landmark category. At the time of enactment of the ordinance, in-
dividual properties might or might not be contemporaneously rezoned to the new
dassification. Until rezoning occurred, nothing would show on the zoning map
itself, and the text provisions in the ordinance would remain as a mere statement
of intent by the governing body as to how it will deal with individual situations in
the future. Thus the floating zone is basically a procedural device, affording the
governing body an opportunity to announce prior to a rezoning what it will do when
the criteria are met by the individual petitioner.
Although the floating zone was originally designed to deal with uses of property
for which no precise location could be nailed down in advance-such as a shopping
center and some types of housing development-it serves a wholly different purpose
in municipal preservation programs. Most historic and aesthetic landmarks have a
fixed location and are well known at the time the ordinance creating the floating
zone is adopted. The floating landmark zone is employed in preservation programs as
a selective tool to extend design and demolition controls to individually significant
structures. It permits a technically qualified body, such as a landmarks commission,
to decide on a case by case basis whether an individual property should be reclassified
and regulated as a landmark. Thus, the New York City statute authorizes the
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Landmarks Preservation Commission to designate landmark structures as well as
landmark districts on the basis of specified criteria of historical and architectural
significance, and imposes design and demolition controls on both designated struc-
tures and districts.
The "mini-district" approach achieves exactly the same end result as the floating
zone by establishing what are essentially one- or two-property special zoning districts
encompassing one or several individually significant landmark structures. Pro-
cedurally, the establishment of the mini-district in the text of the ordinance might
or might not be accompanied by the simultaneous rezoning of a number of in-
dividual properties to the new classification. Precise controls with respect to lot
size, design and demolition, and the permitted uses of the property would be spelled
out in detail in the district regulations. For all practical purposes, the mini-district
would not be unlike any other zoning classification.
The terms "floating zone" and "mini-district" would be unimportant except that
they serve to seriously mislead and confuse planners and lawyers alike. What is
important is that both approaches are potentially capable of being unhorsed as "spot
zoning," which is a third misleading term. To condemn a regulation as spot zoning
is equivalent to saying that the governing body acted arbitrarily and capriciously
in singling out one or two properties for demonstrably unequal treatment. Avoiding
the stigma of spot zoning in this case must depend on the argument that it is not
unequal, unreasonable, or arbitrary to treat historical properties differently from their
unexceptional neighbors.'" Since the permitted distinctions in zoning classification
usually rest upon the location of the property and the characteristics of the neighbor-
hood rather than factors intrinsic to the property itself, courts must be persuaded to
accept historical and aesthetic distinctions in addition to geographical ones.
Norfolk, Virginia, is one of a few cities to experiment with the "mini-district"
approach, by proposing a new classification called the Historical and Cultural Con-
servation District." Norfolk seeks to minimize the spot zoning problem by requiring
that petitions for rezoning property to the Historical and Cultural Conservation
District may be put forth only by a public body (thereby avoiding any show of
private gain) "for a purpose appropriate to comprehensive planning principles, and
one which may indeed be a key element in the success of the comprehensive plan for
the area."' 2 This is important in view of another typical requirement of most state
zoning enabling acts, that the regulations must be "in accordance with a compre-
hensive plan." In this case the "comprehensive plan" or policy is to provide special
treatment for historic landmarks wherever they are located, in a fashion analogous to
zoning provisions sometimes found elsewhere allowing "mom-and-pop" grocery
NEw Yoiu., N.Y., ADMINisRATIZv CODE ch. 8,A.
10 Comment, Legal Methods of Hisoric Preservation, 19 BvuFALo L. Rav. 6xi, 62o (1970); Schatzel,
Public Historic Preservation in Texas, 49 Tax. L. Rav. 267, 317 (1971).
"NORFOLk, VA., CODE OF THE CITY OF NORFOiLK §§ 490-98 (1968).
"Preserving NorfolW's Heritage, Proposed Zoning for Historic and Cultural Consertation, published
by the Department of City Planning, Norfolk, Va. 22 (r965).
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stores anywhere in the city including residential districts from which commercial uses
would otherwise be excluded.
The feasibility of this approach would also seem to depend on the absence in
the zoning enabling legislation of any minimum size requirement for a given district,
plus, perhaps, local rules of construction favorable to the notion that the use of
the term "buildings or places of historical interest" also includes the singular, or
individual, building or place.
It should be noted, of course, that the use of the floating zone and the mini-
district in a landmark context have yet to be tested and approved in court.
II
PROTEcTrING THE LANDMARK OwNER's PROPERTY RIGHTS
To their credit, preservationists approach design and demolition controls from
the point of view of the community's need to preserve and maintain its areas and
structures of historical, aesthetic, and cultural importance for future generations to
enjoy. Legal, practical, and other considerations dictate that the ordinances creating
design and demolition controls also be examined in terms of the landmark owner
and the present enjoyment of his property rights. As used here, the term landmark
owner includes the owner of an isolated landmark as well as the owner of a
structure in an historic district.
Design and demolition controls infringe on and restrict the landmark owner's
right to use his property. Changes in the exterior appearance of a landmark struc-
ture or the destruction of a landmark building and its replacement by a more
profitable one cannot be undertaken without the prior approval of the regulatory
agency administering the controls.' 3 All state courts have recognized, however,
that police power regulations, such as zoning, may limit and restrict the use of real
property for the common good of the community."4
Ordinances imposing design and demolition controls on the activities of land-
mark owners within and outside of historic districts have been tested in the courts
of Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, and New York and upheld in each instance
as valid and proper exercises of the police power.15 Nevertheless, if the regulations,
"
8For a discussion of the operation of design and demolition controls, see Note, Land Use Controls
in Historic Area, 44 NoTR- DAE LAw.-R 379 (1969).
"i 1ox C.J.S. Zoning § 37 (1958); Comment, The Police Power, Eminent Domain, and the Preservation
of Historic Property, 63 CoLum. L. Rav. 708, 713 (1963). For the expression of the contrary view that
design and demolition controls may be unconstitutional without provision for compensation see Com-
ment, Landmark Preservation Laws: Compensation for Temporary Taking, 35 U. Ca. L. REV. 362
(x968).
iCRebman v. City of Springfield, 111 Ill. App. 2d 430, 250 N.E.2d 282 (1969); M&N Enterprises v.
City of Springfield, iii Ill. App. 2d 444, 25o N.E.ad 289 (x969); City of New Orleans v. Levy, 223
La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953); City of New Orleans v. Impastato, 198 La. 205, 3 So. 2d 559 (941); City
of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (194); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate,
333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 783, 128
N.E.2d 563 (1955); Manhattan Club v. Landmarks Preservation Commission, 5i Misc. 2d 556, 273
N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. i966); Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 29 A.D.ad 376, 288 N.Y.S. 314 (x968).
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even though a constitutional exercise of the police power, cast too substantial a
burden on the individual landmark owner, they may constitute an unlawful invasion
of his right of private property which would require the municipality to compensate
the owner. 6 In order to determine whether an ordinance regulating design and
demolition controls interferes with the manner in which the landmark owner uses his
property to a degree amounting to a confiscation of the property, a court is likely
to ask whether the design and demolition restrictions preclude use of the property
for any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted." Merely depriving the owner
of the most beneficial or profitable use of his property does not render the ordinance
unconstitutional' 8
Preservationists must recognize and act on the fact that a landmark owner who
is unreasonably restricted from altering or demolishing his landmark must either
be compensated for the burden he is asked to carry in the public interest, or be freed
from the restrictive regulations. Thus, a landmarks preservation ordinance must
accommodate itself to the individual hardship situation. This is not only a mandate
of the federal and state constitutions but also a practical, political necessity. It will
be difficult, if not impossible, to persuade a city council to adopt an ordinance which
does not contain some relief provisions. Councilmen tend to be sensitive to unduly
burdensome restrictions which may result in unhappy constituents. If there are no
relief provisions in the ordinance, the regulatory agency will meet stiff opposition
both in designating the landmark and administering the controls. The net result
will be a hostile group of owners and an ineffective agency.
A number of methods have been devised to adjust the landmark owner's property
interest to the public's interest in preserving the structure. While many of these
methods have been the subject of litigation, to date no preservation ordinance
containing any of these adjustment provisions has been struck down as confiscatory.
It should be pointed out that in some rare instances the public interest may be
deemed, legislatively at least, always to outweigh the private burden. The Sche-
nectady, New York, ordinance assumes that pre-i925 buildings are of such im-
portance to the community that demolition should be absolutely prohibited, unless
the building has become a public safety hazard.19
Probably the most common relief provision in landmark preservation ordinances
is the requirement that an owner, who proposes to alter or demolish a building, must
postpone his alteration or demolition plans for a specified period. What period of
delay would be upheld by a court as reasonable cannot be answered with certainty.
"
0 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); 1 P. NicHoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.42(10)
(Rev. 3d ed. 1967).
27 1 P. NicHoLs, E INENT DoatN § 1.42(8) (Rev. 3d ed. x967); x A. RATnxOPF & C. RATimopp, LAw
o ZONINo AND PLANNING 6-xo (3d ed. 1956); Forrest v. Evershed, 7 N.Y.2d 256, 196 N.YS.2d 958
(I959).
1 8 Teuscher v. Westport, 154 Conn. 650, 228 A.2d 518 (1967) (beneficial use); Rebman v. City of
Springfield, iii Ill. App. 2d 430, 250 N.E.2d 282 (1969) (profitable use).10 SCHENEcTADY, N.Y., GENE.RA. CITY L&w ORDrNANcEs No. 14221, § 7-C (1962).
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In some situations a postponement of one month might cause a substantial loss,
whereas in others a postponement of one year might result only in inconvenience. The
actual delay period stipulated in various ordinances, aside from any periods for filing
documents, holding hearings, etc., varies widely from one municipality to another.
Charleston, South Carolina, authorizes a three month delay; 20 Richmond, Virginia,
stipulates six months;2 New York City allows up to one year;2 2 Madison, Wisconsin,
sets six months for alterations and one year for demolitions;2 and Alexandria, Vir-
ginia, specifies time periods for pre-1846 buildings ranging from three months to twelve
months, depending on the fair market value of the property involved 4
The purpose of the postponement is to afford an opportunity to the regulatory
agency and other interested parties, both public and private, to reappraise the historical
and aesthetic value of the landmark and to develop a feasible alternative preservation
plan. The plan may be based upon the voluntary consent of the owner, as for
example the sale of the property to a preservation-minded buyer, or acceptance of
a restrictive covenant or a preservation easement. Or it may not require his consent,
such as in a case where the municipality decides to exercise its power of eminent
domain and acquire the landmark for public use.
The postponement approach carries with it the ultimate assurance to the owner
that if he follows the statutory procedures, he will eventually be free of the restric-
tions. In spite of this obvious invitation to the owner simply to sit and wait out the
prescribed period, it has proved to be an extremely useful preservation tool3P
In the first place, the application procedures for a permit to alter or demolish open
the door for the commencement of a preservation dialogue with the owner. Pres-
ervationists are alerted to the problem and are granted a grace period to organize
private or public action to prevent irreparable loss. And finally, the determined owner
soon finds himself centrally involved in the preservation process since he must
cooperate with the regulatory agency in order to perfect his right to be free of the
regulation. That involvement can be fatal to his alteration or demolition plan
because it gives the agency an opportunity to educate the owner in terms of historic
conservation and, perhaps, to change his point of view.
Various tax incentives offer another method for lightening the burden of the
regulations on the landmark owner to the point where he will be willing and able
to comply with the regulations. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and New York
City both incorporate special tax benefit provisions in their statutes3P
20 MoaausoN, supra note I, at 133.
RicHmo0ND, VA., CODE oF TrE CITY op mR-icoND §§ 52-249 to 53-11 (1953)-
22 Naw YoRx, N.Y., ADwNIS-TAT VE CODE § 2o5-8.og(2) (1965).
2
3 
8 DISON, WIs., MAnIsoN GENERAL ORDINANCES § 33.01 (5) (1970).
2
'ALExANDRrA, VA., CoDE or THE CIT oF ALExANDRiA art. XIV (1963).
- Tinkcom, supra note 3, at 393; Interview with Frank B. Gilbert, Secretary, New York City Land-
marks Preservation Commission, Oct. 3, 1970.
"' See note following Law of June 27, 1969, tit. 13, § 551, [1970] Laws of Puerto Rico Ann.
256; Naw Yor, N.Y., ADmNsRATvz CODE § 205-8.oC (1965). See also Wilson and Winkler, The Re-
sponse of State Legislation to Historic Preservation, 36 LAw & CONTE P. PRo1. 329 (971).
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Chicago has put forth still another method of relief in an ordinance which pro-
vides that the owner who wishes to alter or demolish his landmark has the right
to compel the city to decide whether it will exercise its power of eminent domain
and compensate the owner, or whether it will release him from the regulations7
The owner is also required to postpone his plans to alter or demolish for a specified
period in order to permit the Chicago City Council to take such action2
The Chicago approach can be carried one step further by establishing in advance
a measurable point at which the burden of the restrictions will be deemed to be
too heavy for the owner to bear. Once that point is reached, the municipality must
then take the initiative and decide whether it wishes to pay compensation or release
the owner from the restrictions. The New York City ordinance embodies this con-
cept of an objective standard to determine when the restrictions constitute a
"taking," and provides for action to be taken by the regulatory agency to alleviate
the affected property owner's hardship. If the owner of a New York landmark can
show that he cannot realize a reasonable return from his property--"reasonable
return" is defined as a net annual return of 6% on the current assessed value of his
property-he thereby imposes an obligation on the New York City Landmarks
Preservation Commission. to devise a preservation plan, which may include tax
exemptions or acquisition by the city, within a specified time period.20 If the city's
efforts do not produce positive results, the owner is at liberty to proceed without the
encumbrance of the regulations. In 1966 the New York Supreme Court upheld
this general approach in Manhattan Club v. Landmarks Preservation Commission,
stating that "the statute is not confiscatory. Petitioner is free to do as it pleases with
the interior of the building. It is guaranteed a reasonable return on its investment.
And if no plan can be devised to materialize this guarantee, it may make such
changes as it wishes. ' 0
CONCLUSION
As one observer has noted, "Preservation, like any other form of zoning, involves
a close and difficult balancing of public necessity and private interest."3" Preserva-
tion problems created by design and demolition controls can and must be solved
in a manner which accommodates the interests of the community to those of the
landmark owner. While there is a paucity of specific judicially-endorsed guidelines
to aid in reaching these solutions, there are a multitude of legislative precedents
and techniques available for protecting both the landmarks and the landmark
owner's property rights.
7 CmcAGo, ILL., REv. MuzicrPA CODE § 21-64.1 (1968).
28 Id.
s1 Naw Yorx, N.Y., AmmINsmm&ATmV CODE § 205-8.oc (x965).
"0 Manhattan Club v. Landmarks Preservation Commission, 51 Misc. 2d 556, 560, 273 N.Y.S.2d 848,
852 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
31 Comment, supra note 14, at 732.
